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Abstract It is typically assumed that people engage in entrepreneurship because
there are profits to be made. In contrast to this view, this paper argues that
entrepreneurship is more adequately characterized as a non-profit-seeking activity.
Evidence from a broad range of authors and academic fields is discussed showing
that entrepreneurship does quite generally not pay in monetary terms. Being an
entrepreneur seems to be rather rewarding because it entails substantial non-
monetary benefits, like greater autonomy, broader skill utilization, and the possibility
to pursue one’s own ideas. It is shown how incorporating these non-monetary
benefits into economic models of entrepreneurship can lead to a better understanding
of the phenomenon.
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[The entrepreneur] often holds his own with great tenacity even under
considerable disadvantages; for the freedom and dignity of his position are
very attractive to him.
Alfred Marshall, “Principles of Economics,” VI.VII.20
...but more, much more than this, I did it my way.
Frank Sinatra, “My Way”
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Entrepreneurship has received a renewed interest in economics over the last few
years. It is acknowledged that entrepreneurs have played a crucial role for the
successful transition of former socialist to market economies in the 1990s (McMillan
& Woodruff, 2002); their essential function as agents of economic change, already
described by Schumpeter (1934), is reappraised in the context of growth theory
(Aghion & Howitt, 1997); and the important role of entrepreneurs for innovation is
stressed (Baumol, 2004). Following this increased interest, economists have also
begun to propose new theoretical accounts of entrepreneurship (e.g., Lazear, 2005;
Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991). Typically, economic models of entrepreneurship
start from the assumption that entrepreneurial activities are undertaken when it pays
to do so. People become entrepreneurs because there are profits to be made, and they
are rewarded for their entrepreneurial undertakings in terms of income and wealth.
In this paper, it is argued that entrepreneurship cannot possibly be understood as a
quest for profit alone. Rather, a more accurate description of entrepreneurship is that
of a non-profit-seeking activity. A considerable body of empirical evidence has been
brought about in recent years showing that entrepreneurship does quite generally not
pay in a monetary sense. People engage in entrepreneurship, for example, although
they could earn more money in alternative work settings, like being a regular
employee, and they keep investing their wealth in their own firms although risk-
adjusted returns on the public stock market are higher. I discuss a broad range of
empirical evidence indicating that entrepreneurship is not particularly attractive in
material terms. The empirical evidence in fact suggests that being an entrepreneur is
rewarding in a different way, namely by providing individuals with non-pecuniary
satisfaction from aspects like being their own bosses, having the possibility to use
their skills and abilities, and pursuing their own creative ideas.
Many of the issues raised in this paper are aptly summarized in the two citations
given at the outset. Unlike current economic theorizing, classical economists like
Marshall have been careful in depicting the entrepreneur not as a purely profit-driven
person, but as an actor importantly motivated by non-economic concerns, like the
“freedom and dignity of his position.” Similar notions are reminiscent in Frank
Sinatra’s signature song “My Way,” which is often considered as an embodiment of
the American dream (Sinatra used to announce this song in his concerts with the
words “We’re about to sing the national anthem, but you needn’t rise”; Friedwald,
1995: 445). Interestingly, the song does not praise success in terms of wealth or
income, but sees the way by which things are done as important. This theme very
much resounds in the present study of entrepreneurship: this essential function in
market economies is not undertaken so much in pursuit of better material outcomes,
but because it is a satisfying way to do things in itself.1
The aim of this paper is not to give a comprehensive survey of the literature on
entrepreneurship; an excellent account of the existing research can be found e.g., in
Parker (2004). Rather, the purpose is to offer a re-conceptualization of the economic
view on entrepreneurship. The article begins by shortly discussing definitions of
entrepreneurship, and then presents empirical evidence from a broad range of
1 Entrepreneurship can therefore be seen as a source of “procedural utility” (Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004),
meaning that people do not only value material outcomes, but also the processes and conditions leading to
outcomes.
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authors and academic fields showing that entrepreneurship is essentially a non-
profit-seeking activity. Further, implications of this novel view for economic theory
are explored. Using recent theoretical models of entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2005;
Murphy et al., 1991), it is illustrated how the understanding of entrepreneurial
behavior is changed once non-economic considerations are taken into account.
Subsequently, some extensions of the arguments are discussed, and important
counterarguments against the re-conceptualization addressed. In particular, it is
discussed to what extent entrepreneurial over-optimism and risk-seeking can also
explain the empirical regularities. After presenting consequences for economic
policy, the paper is concluded by offering some short closing remarks.
Empirical evidence on the non-profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship
Who is an entrepreneur?
Entrepreneurship is a concept notoriously difficult to define. While some observers
have equated it with business ownership, others have stressed the innovative
character of the activity, arguing, for example, that managers introducing new
products, business processes or organizational structures should also be seen as
entrepreneurs, whereas business owners not engaging in innovative activities should
not be counted as such (for a discussion of different views on entrepreneurship, see
e.g., van Praag, 1999; Parker, 2004). For the purposes of this paper, it seems
appropriate to assume a pragmatic definition of entrepreneurship. Being an
entrepreneur is defined here to mean that someone is a self-employed business
owner. While this definition puts strong emphasis on the ownership aspect of
entrepreneurship, it will be relaxed later in the paper, in order to show that the
arguments can be extended also to areas outside the narrow scope of business
ownership.
Does entrepreneurship pay?—evidence from compensating differentials on labor
and capital markets
An important question in entrepreneurship research is whether it pays to be an
entrepreneur. Information on the monetary returns to entrepreneurship is crucial,
because it allows to assess the economic incentives that people face to engage in
entrepreneurial undertakings. Over the recent years, there has been a rise in rigorous
empirical work on the monetary rewards associated with entrepreneurship. This
considerable body of evidence shows a remarkably clear picture: entrepreneurship is
not particularly attractive in material terms.
A first influential study on the monetary returns to entrepreneurship is provided
by Hamilton (2000). The author compares the relative earnings of employed and
self-employed persons in the United States using a particularly detailed dataset. The
empirical results document an inferior earnings situation for most entrepreneurs.
Self-employed business owners are found to start out with lower initial earnings than
persons in paid employment, and they subsequently also experience lower earnings
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growth. This leads to substantial income differences over time. After 10 years in
business, the median entrepreneur earns 35% less than what he or she could have
obtained in a paid job of the same duration. It is noteworthy that this finding of
substantial earnings differences does not depend on the measure of self-employment
earnings used, and it cannot be explained by a generally lower ability of persons
entering self-employment, as the author shows in a self-selection model. The study,
however, may not adequately account for the possibility of the self-employed to
“consume on the job” (e.g., by calculating the use of a private car as a business
expense). On the other hand, important fringe benefits, like employer-provided
health insurance, are not accounted for in the calculation of employees’ earnings.
The results by Hamilton (2000) suggest that entrepreneurship in the United States
does quite generally not pay in monetary terms. The largest part of entrepreneurs
seems to get less out of their businesses than what they could earn as regular
employees. Only the most successful entrepreneurs, namely those in the top quartile
of the income distribution, are found to have similar or higher earnings than
comparable employees. This reflects a stylized fact about entrepreneurial incomes
that has also been documented for other countries: the returns to entrepreneurship are
characterized by a “superstar-distribution” (for West Germany, see Merz, 2004; for
Finland, Poutvaara & Tuomala, 2004; and for older evidence on a broader set of
OECD countries, OECD, 1992).2 According to Rosen (1981), a superstar-
distribution exists when a small number of individuals earns very high incomes,
but most individuals’ incomes are below average. Entrepreneurial earnings
correspond to such a very skewed distribution. Hamilton (2000) shows that, as a
consequence, the average earnings of the self-employed in the United States are
considerably higher than their median earnings; in fact, they are quite comparable to
the average earnings of employees. In expected terms, thus, the monetary returns to
entrepreneurship are not different from those in dependent employment. However,
because entrepreneurship is associated with a considerably higher income variance
and income risk, one would expect average self-employed earnings to be higher than
average employee earnings, as the increased income risk should be compensated by
a risk premium.
The material situation of entrepreneurs is highlighted from a different angle in a
second influential study by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). The authors
do not look at self-employment earnings, but study the returns to private equity, i.e.,
equity that is not publicly traded on stockmarkets. Private equity is largely
equivalent with the investments that entrepreneurs make in their own firms; in the
United States, for example, only about 1% of all private equity is held by venture
capital funds, while the rest is owned by private households. The study by
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) establishes several interesting facts about
these entrepreneurial investments. First, they show that entrepreneurs invest a large
part of their total wealth in the firms that they run, on average 70%. Second, despite
this dramatic lack of diversification, the financial returns on private equity are on
average not higher than that of public equity traded on stockmarkets. Entrepreneurs
2 It is an interesting question why there is a superstar-distribution of entrepreneurial incomes. This is
further explored in “Why is there a superstar-distribution of entrepreneurial incomes?” and “Counter-
arguments and alternative explanations.”
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seem to invest large amounts of their wealth in their own firms, although they could
obtain higher risk-adjusted returns on the public equity market. Entrepreneurship,
again, is found not to pay in a monetary sense, in comparison to the relevant
alternatives. Further evidence from capital markets corroborates this observation.
Kerins, Smith, and Smith (2004), for example, show that entrepreneurs are willing to
bear a much higher cost of capital for their ventures than diversified investors. In the
same vein, Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo (1997) document that many entre-
preneurial firms survive and continue in business despite comparatively low
financial performance.
A third way to assess the monetary success of entrepreneurs is to look at inventions
made by small-business owners. Entrepreneurial innovations play an important role
for the total innovative activity in market economies; it has been shown, for example,
that the majority of “break-through” innovations is made by entrepreneurs, while large
firms investing in R&D rather concentrate on “incremental” innovations (Baumol,
2004). A study by Åstebro (2003) investigates the financial returns that
entrepreneurs make on their innovative activities using a large dataset of inventions.
The results show that the average return on entrepreneurial innovations is rather
unimpressive; it is lower than the return to high-risk securities or early-stage venture
capital funds. More importantly, the financial success of entrepreneurial innovations
is very unequally distributed. Only between 7 and 9% of all inventions reach the
market, and while a handful of those realize very high returns (above 1,400%), the
majority fails to obtain positive returns, leading to a negative return for the median
invention. Entrepreneurs seem to engage in innovative activities although in most
cases, they do not gain, but lose money from doing it. Again, the empirical evidence
shows that entrepreneurship is not particularly attractive in material terms.
The evidence discussed from the labor and capital markets documents a quite
surprising finding about entrepreneurship. Being an entrepreneur emerges as an
activity that does quite generally not pay in monetary terms. Rather, comparatively
speaking, entrepreneurship seems to be better characterized as a non-profit-seeking
activity. But if entrepreneurship doesn’t pay, why do people engage in it?
What makes entrepreneurship attractive?—evidence on non-pecuniary benefits
of being an entrepreneur
The existence of compensating wage and return differentials for entrepreneurship has
led many observers to speculate why people undertake entrepreneurial activities.
Hamilton (2000: 628), for example, sees as a plausible explanation for his results
presented above that “self-employment offers significant nonpecuniary benefits,
such as ‘being your own boss’.” Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002: 772f.) also
regard the high independence and autonomy of business owners as a potential
explanation of their findings, but they discuss also alternative interpretations, such as
a lower risk aversion of entrepreneurs, over-optimism, and a preference for skewed
outcome distributions (similar to lotteries). Similar arguments are brought forward
by Åstebro (2003). None of these studies, however, directly investigates the question
why people engage in entrepreneurship despite the adverse monetary consequences.
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The potential non-material benefits of being an entrepreneur have been researched
in recent studies by Benz and Frey (2007), Frey and Benz (2003) and Hundley
(2001). The authors employ an empirical approach that aims at evaluating
entrepreneurs’ utility at their jobs directly, by using measures of job satisfaction as
proxies for the utility gained from work. The studies show, first, that self-employed
people are considerably more satisfied with their jobs than employed persons,
corroborating a result that is by now well established in the labor economics
literature (e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Blanchflower, 2000; Kawaguchi,
2002).3 The authors then investigate why self-employed business owners are happier
with their jobs. Benz and Frey (2007), using a sample of 23 countries from different
geographical and cultural world regions, show that the higher job satisfaction of the
self-employed can largely be attributed to two factors: higher autonomy and a more
interesting work content. They find that in Western European, North American and
Eastern European countries, the higher autonomy and the more interesting jobs of
the self-employed explain a large part of the job satisfaction differential between
self-employed and employed persons, while other work aspects like pay, job security
or opportunities for advancement cannot account for the observed differences (see
also Frey & Benz, 2003). Very similar results are presented for the United States by
Hundley (2001). The author shows that self-employed persons in the U.S. are mainly
more satisfied in their jobs because they have more autonomy, greater possibilities to
use their skills and abilities, as well as a higher work flexibility.
The studies discussed give a direct indication of the non-monetary benefits
associated with entrepreneurship. Being an entrepreneur seems to be attractive, not
because it leads to a high income or wealth, but rather because it provides non-
pecuniary satisfaction from being one’s own boss, from broad possibilities to use
one’s skills and abilities, and from a resulting richer work content. Although no
direct evidence has been presented, it can be hypothesized that similar aspects are
responsible for Åstebro’s (2003) finding that entrepreneurs are willing to engage in
innovative activities despite of poor expected financial returns. Amabile (1983,
1997), for example, argues that people often undertake creative endeavors simply
because they like to engage in interesting, exciting and personally challenging
activities. It should be noted, however, that the studies presented cannot completely
rule out alternative explanations of the results, like a tendency of entrepreneurs to be
less risk-averse or more over-optimistic. These alternative interpretations will be
further addressed later in the paper.
3 Several of these studies also show that the higher job satisfaction of self-employed people is not due to
different personality characteristics. If e.g., intrinsically optimistic people are more likely to be self-
employed, and at the same time report higher job satisfaction regardless of their employment situation, a
positive relationship between self-employment and job satisfaction might merely reflect personality
differences. Using an individual-fixed-effects methodology in panel data, Frey and Benz (2003),
Kawaguchi (2002) and Hundley (2001) document that this is unlikely to be the case. It is also noteworthy
that the self-employment—job satisfaction result does not crucially depend on the definition of self-
employment. Blanchflower (2004), for example, shows that self-employed business owners with
employees, who can be considered as the most ‘entrepreneurial’ group within the self-employed, have
generally the highest job satisfaction among self-employed people.
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Why do people start firms?—subjective assessments of prospective entrepreneurs
The evidence presented so far shall be complemented with findings that do not rely
on rigorous empirical methods, but are rather based on entrepreneurs’ own
assessments of why they started their own firms. Qualitative data can give important
additional insights into people’s motivations to engage in entrepreneurial activities.
The existing studies largely confirm the view that entrepreneurship is essentially a
non-profit-seeking activity.
An early qualitative study is provided by Vivarelli (1991), who investigates the
reasons for starting a firm in a sample of Italian entrepreneurs. Among multiple
reasons that people can choose from, “aspiration to a higher income” is mentioned
by less than half of the entrepreneurs as a motivation for engaging in entre-
preneurship (47.1%). In contrast, non-pecuniary factors are considered to be much
more important. Almost 80% of the entrepreneurs state that the “desire to be
independent” was crucial for their choice to start their own firm (78.9%). In a similar
vein, the goal to “better exploit one’s own technical capabilities” (53.6%) is seen to
be relevant, as well as the desire to “better exploit one’s own managerial capabilities”
(36.6%) and “commercial capabilities” (31.3%). Other potential factors, like “family
tradition” (14.1%) and “other factors” (7.9%), are attributed a minor role.
Entrepreneurs thus think that they are mainly motivated to start a firm by the non-
pecuniary qualities of entrepreneurship, like the possibility to be one’s own boss and
to put one’s skills and abilities to use. Although monetary factors are mentioned as
well, they are judged to be of lesser importance. A second study by Vivarelli (2004)
reaches very similar findings covering a somewhat broader set of reasons to start a
firm. The desire for autonomy and independence again emerges as the main reason
to become an entrepreneur, while pecuniary factors such as profit expectations or the
intention to exploit a market niche only take an intermediate position. Amit et al.
(2000) show for a sample of Canadian high technology entrepreneurs that personal
wealth attainment is significantly less important for their decision to found a firm
than an aggregate index of ten other work dimensions; moreover, compared to a
control group of technology managers that decided not to start a venture,
entrepreneurs are found to be significantly less concerned with wealth considerations
when thinking about starting a firm.
Evaluation
Empirical research employing a wide range of methodological approaches, covering
different countries and data sources, and stemming from a variety of authors and
academic fields shows a regularity about entrepreneurship that has rarely been
interpreted in a common light. Being an entrepreneur is not particularly attractive in
expected monetary terms; rather, comparatively speaking, entrepreneurship seems to
be more adequately characterized as a non-profit-seeking activity. People engage in
entrepreneurial undertakings despite of poor expected financial returns, but they gain
utility from other aspects associated with entrepreneurship, like independence, greater
possibilities to use one’s abilities, and the chance to be creative in doing one’s own
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thing. Economic theories of entrepreneurship are likely to gain from taking these
factors into account.
The notion that entrepreneurship is a non-profit-seeking activity should not be
taken to mean, of course, that entrepreneurs are not interested in money at all.
Entrepreneurs are certainly also motivated by financial considerations, especially at
the margin. There is ample evidence that entrepreneurs react to changes in financial
incentives in predictable economic ways (for taxes, see e.g., Schuetze & Bruce,
2004; for profit making opportunities, e.g., McMillan & Woodruff, 2002; Baumol,
1990, 1993; and for patent protection, e.g., Hvide, 2004). The argument made here,
however, is that in comparison to the relevant alternatives, entrepreneurship is not
only and not even mainly a quest for profit. Entrepreneurial ventures are to a
considerable extent undertaken for reasons other than financial gain.
Implications for economic theories of entrepreneurship
If entrepreneurship is a non-profit-seeking activity, how does this change economic
theories of entrepreneurship? In this section, it shall be illustrated using recent
models of entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2005; Murphy et al., 1991) how the
incorporation of non-monetary concerns alters the understanding of entrepreneurial
behavior, and that different predictions result from an enriched model of
entrepreneurship. Although the theoretical modelling of entrepreneurship offered
here is extremely simple, and the changes introduced may appear minor, a different
view on entrepreneurship nevertheless emerges from this theoretical treatment.
Lazear’s model of entrepreneurship and balanced skills
In a recent paper, Lazear (2005) proposes a straightforward but powerful model of
entrepreneurship. The basic theoretical idea is that entrepreneurs have to be
sufficiently good at a variety of skills, while people who work for others can
specialize in a single skill. For example, it may be enough to be a talented software
programmer to be a good employee, but it is not sufficient to successfully start an
internet firm. In addition to being skilled in software development, the founder of a
firm must be able to obtain financing, hire motivated employees, find office space at
a reasonable cost, keep books, stick to the business plan, and market the firm. The
success of the entrepreneurial venture importantly depends on the “weakest link” in
this set of tasks the entrepreneur has to perform. Lazear’s model expresses this
feature of entrepreneurship in the following production functions:
specialist income ¼ max x1; x2½  ð1Þ
entrepreneur income ¼ lmin x1; x2½  ð2Þ
where x1, x2 are two skills that an individual possesses. Equations 1 and 2 capture
the notion that people who are specialists receive an income that is determined by
their best skill, while the income of entrepreneurs is limited by their weakest
attribute. The parameter λ measures the value of the entrepreneurial function, i.e., it
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reflects the market compensation that individuals receive in return for engaging in
entrepreneurial activities.
Who becomes an entrepreneur in this model? It is straightforward to see that an
individual with skills (x1, x2) chooses to be an entrepreneur if the income from
entrepreneurship is greater than the income that can be obtained as a specialist:
lmin x1; x2½  > max x1; x2½  ð3Þ
This simple model leads to several predictions, which can be easiest illustrated
graphically. In Fig. 1, the two skills x1, x2 are plotted on the x-axis and y-axis,
respectively. The 45° line denotes all cases where x1=x2. If x1>x2 (points below the
45° line), then an individual becomes an entrepreneur if:
x2 > x1=l because min x1; x2½  ¼ x2 and max x1; x2½  ¼ x1ð Þ ð4Þ
If, on the other hand, x2>x1 (points above the 45° line), then an individual will be an
entrepreneur if:
x1 > x2=l , x2 < lx1 ð5Þ
These two conditions for individuals engaging in entrepreneurship are shown as the
shaded area in Fig. 1. The regions lying outside of this area correspond to
individuals who become specialists, because they have sufficiently high values of
one skill relative to the other, so that it pays to specialize in one of them and receive
income x1 or x2, respectively.
Figure 1 makes several interesting features of this theoretical account of
entrepreneurship apparent. First, the supply of entrepreneurship increases in λ, i.e.,
people are more likely to become entrepreneurs when the market compensation for
entrepreneurship rises. An increase in λ, graphically, enlarges the shaded area in
Fig. 1, thus leading to a larger number of entrepreneurs. Second, more “balanced”
individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs. Graphically, this can easiest be
seen for the case where x1=x2 (45° line), which represents the highest likelihood that
Figure 1 Lazear's (2005) theory of entrepreneurship
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an individual chooses to be an entrepreneur. The more unbalanced skills become, i.e.,
the further one moves towards one of the axes, the smaller is the likelihood of an
individual being an entrepreneur. Lazear (2005), Wagner (2003) and Backes-Gellner
and Lazear (2003) provide ample empirical evidence in particular for the second
prediction. They find, for example, that individuals who hold a larger number of
prior job roles, or that study a broader curriculum in a MBA program, are more
likely to become entrepreneurs. Both results are consistent with the view that either
more balanced individuals pursue broader interests or that individuals who wish to
become entrepreneurs invest in acquiring a broader set of skills.
Lazear’s model is also instructive in a different way, namely because it allows to
embody almost all relevant economic theories of entrepreneurship in one single
parameter, λ. The parameter λ, generally speaking, measures the market value of
entrepreneurial activity, but it is worthwhile to think about what λ reflects in market
equilibrium. Most modern economic theories of entrepreneurship (e.g., Kihlstrom &
Laffont, 1979) would treat λ as a risk premium, following the tradition of Knight
(1921), who described the primary function of the entrepreneur as one of a risk-
taker. Schumpeter (1934) would likely conceive λ as a temporary monopoly profit
attached to disruptive innovation, in some cases protected by patents. In a similar
vein, Kirzner’s (1973) treatment of entrepreneurship would embody λ as a reward
for “attentiveness” and for “being an arbitrageur” that exploits new profit making
opportunities. There might also be other interpretations of λ, one of which will be
given and discussed below.
Accounting for non-monetary benefits of entrepreneurship
How is the understanding of entrepreneurship changed if non-monetary concerns are
taken into account? The consequences of including non-monetary benefits into the
theoretical model can be easiest illustrated by slightly changing Lazear’s formulation
of occupational choice. Below, the term “specialist/entrepreneur income” is replaced
with “specialist/entrepreneur utility,” and the respective Eqs. 1 and 2 are rewritten as
follows:
specialist utility ¼ max x1; x2½  ð6Þ
entrepreneur utility ¼ lþ mð Þmin x1; x2½  ð7Þ
Equations 6 and 7 reflect the notion that income is not the only important factor in the
decision to become an entrepreneur. Rather, the utility of being an entrepreneur
consists of the income earned and a non-monetary factor μ, a factor that is not
achievable for people who work for someone else. The factor μ has quite an intuitive
interpretation in this framework: it is the non-monetary utility individuals get from
being able to put not only one, but both their skills to use. Following the empirical
results presented in “Empirical evidence on the non-profit-seeking nature of
entrepreneurship,” μ can be best thought of as the non-monetary satisfaction that
entrepreneurs enjoy from having more possibilities to exercise their skills and abilities.
In a broader sense, μ may also reflect non-monetary utility from pursuing one’s own
creative ideas (if the second skill is “creativity”), or from the autonomy to decide how
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much one wants to engage in more than one skill or activity. In any case, following the
formulation of the modified model given above, entrepreneurs enjoy a non-monetary
satisfaction μ from every unit of the additional skill they are able to exercise.
It is straightforward to show how the inclusion of μ alters the theoretical
understanding of entrepreneurship. In this modified model, an individual will
become an entrepreneur if:
x2 > x1= lþ mð Þ for the case x1 > x2ð Þ ð8Þ
and
x1 > x2= lþ mð Þ for the case x2 > x1ð Þ ð9Þ
Because x1= λþ μð Þ < x1=l, and x2= λþ μð Þ < x2=λ, it follows that the income
thresholds x2 and x1 for engaging in entrepreneurship, respectively, are lower when
people gain non-monetary utility μ from being an entrepreneur. Graphically, the
existence of μ causes the shaded area in Fig. 1 to increase, as the borders of the
shaded area move towards the axes.
The modified model generates several interesting implications. First, as in Lazear
(2005), it predicts that individuals with balanced skills are more likely to become
entrepreneurs, but in contrast to Lazear’s original model, people need not earn high
monetary returns on their varied abilities in order to choose entrepreneurship.
Individuals may actually enter entrepreneurship even if the monetary returns on
balanced skills are negative (λ<1). This prediction clearly contrasts with Lazear’s
original formulation. Second, and relatedly, the modified model suggests that
individuals are willing to pay a price in order to be an entrepreneur, i.e., it predicts a
compensating income differential associated with entrepreneurship. And third, the
overall supply of entrepreneurship is larger when people enjoy non-monetary utility
from being an entrepreneur. This last effect can most pronouncedly be seen for the
case where λ=1, i.e.,when the market provides no income premium associated with
entrepreneurship whatsoever. In contrast to a model based on income considerations,
our modified model predicts a positive supply of entrepreneurship even under this
condition that no profits can be made. All the three theoretical predictions proposed
can in principle be tested empirically.
The modified model of entrepreneurship corresponds well with some empirical
facts. First, its predictions are consistent with the finding that entrepreneurship
entails compensating wage and return differentials. According to Hamilton (2000)
and Moskovitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), these wage and return differentials
can be of substantial magnitude, pointing to large non-monetary benefits of entre-
preneurship. Second, evidence reported by Åstebro (2005) suggests that monetary
returns to varied ability are negative for a sample of Canadian entrepreneurs. This
result can be explained by a ‘taste for variety,’ as proposed here, but not in Lazear’s
(2005) framework. The modified model, however, also has drawbacks. In particular,
it cannot explain why the overall distribution of entrepreneurial incomes is
characterized by a superstar-distribution. To account for this stylized fact, we
propose below a modified version of a model by Murphy et al. (1991), describing
the choice to become an entrepreneur in a somewhat different way.
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Why is there a superstar-distribution of entrepreneurial incomes?
Murphy et al. (1991) provide a simple model of occupational choice that can shed
light on the relative earnings distributions of entrepreneurs and employees. In their
theoretical account of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs are assumed to run firms and
employees work for someone else, with their respective incomes defined as follows:
worker income ¼ w A ð10Þ
entrepreneur income ¼ s A F Hð Þ  w H ð11Þ
where A is the ability of an individual, s is a common state of technology, F is a
standard concave production function, H is the aggregate human capital of the workers
employed in a firm (a proxy for firm size), w is the workers’ wage, w H are the
production costs of the entrepreneur, and the price of the goods produced by
entrepreneurs is by assumption normalized to 1. In this model, individuals have to
make two decisions. First, they take the common state of technology s and the wage
w as given and decide whether to engage in entrepreneurship or dependent
employment. Second, if a person decides to become an entrepreneur, he or she has
to choose the size of the firm he or she wants to run. As can be shown using the first
order condition of entrepreneurial income with respect to firm size H, entrepreneurs
with higher ability A will run larger firms:
s A F 0 Hð Þ ¼ w ð12Þ
i.e., because F′(H) is decreasing in A, more able individuals will choose to run firms of
a larger size. Equation 12 indicates that the firm size H(A) is an endogenous variable in
the model, and therefore it should be included in the formulation of the entrepreneurial
income:
entrepreneur income ¼ s A F H Að Þð Þ  w H Að Þ ð13Þ
The individual choice of occupation can now be derived. A person will become an
entrepreneur if the income from doing so exceeds the income that can be obtained as a
worker:
s A F H Að Þð Þ  w H Að Þ > w A ð14Þ
Equation 14 contains the main theoretical idea of the model, namely that
entrepreneurship is characterized by increasing returns to ability. It is attractive for
persons with high ability to become entrepreneurs because entrepreneurial profits are a
convex function of A, while workers’ incomes only rise linearly in A. This
characteristic comes about because an entrepreneur’s output (s A F(H(A))) rises more
with ability than do his or her production costs (w H(A)).4 As a consequence, more
4 If, for example, a logarithmic production function is assumed, F(H)=log(H), then it follows from Eq. 12
that H*=s·A/w. The resulting entrepreneur’s income is s·A·log(s·A/w)−s·A, i.e., the production costs s·A
rise proportionally with A, while the output s·A·log(s·A/w) rises more than proportionally with A (see
Fig. 2).
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able entrepreneurs strive to run larger firms so that they can spread their ability
advantage over a larger market. In a sense, the existence of increasing returns to ability
creates a naturally occurring monopoly position for entrepreneurs that is not competed
away even in a perfectly competitive market. Entrepreneurs can benefit more or less
from their high ability depending on the returns to scale in their “industry,” which is
measured by the concavity of the production function F(H). Analogies to other
markets are obvious, e.g., the arts or sports markets, where the ablest individuals can
earn disproportionally high incomes, in particular when there are high returns to scale
(like in the global markets for movies or tennis).5
What are the predictions of this model with respect to entrepreneurs’ and workers’
incomes? In Fig. 2, a graphical representation of the model is given, indicating how
the incomes of workers and entrepreneurs depend on ability A. A* denotes a
threshold value that separates entrepreneurs from workers. For values A>A*,
individuals become entrepreneurs, and for values A<A*, they choose to be an
employee (as indicated by the solid income-line). Figure 2 clearly illustrates a core
prediction of the model: entrepreneurs earn strictly higher incomes than employees.
In particular, the average as well as median incomes of entrepreneurs are higher than
those of workers, the more so the more increasing returns to ability are.
How does the understanding of entrepreneurship change when non-monetary
benefits are taken into account? Again, we slightly change the formulation of the
model by replacing the term “worker/entrepreneur income” with “worker/entrepre-
neur utility,” and rewrite the respective Eqs. 10 and 11 as follows:
worker utility ¼ w A ð13Þ
entrepreneur utility ¼ s A F H Að Þð Þ  w H Að Þ þ m ð14Þ
5 It should be noted that the model of Murphy et al. (1991) only includes one dimension of ability, while
Lazear’s (2005) model stresses the importance of the balance of abilities for entrepreneurship. The two
approaches can be made compatible when A is assumed to be a measure for the balance of abilities rather
then a measure for general ability.
ability A 
income entrepreneur 
income 
worker income
A*
Figure 2 Increasing returns to ability for entrepreneurship (Murphy et al., 1991)
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where μ represents non-monetary benefits of entrepreneurship, like being one’s own
boss or having greater possibilities to put one’s skills and abilities to use. The
inclusion of μ into the model alters the predictions on the relative incomes of
entrepreneurs and workers considerably, as can be seen in Fig. 3.
Figure 3 makes clear that the existence of μ causes the ability threshold to fall
(from A* to A**), and individuals become entrepreneurs already in situations where
they earn less than employees (as indicated by the solid income-line). The model
thus predicts that a considerable share of entrepreneurs earns lower incomes than
employees (depending on the mass distribution of ability A in the population). At the
same time, the model predicts that the richest individuals in the economy will be
entrepreneurs, and that these individuals earn far above-average incomes. Both
predictions correspond well with the stylized fact that entrepreneurial incomes are
characterized by a superstar-distribution. The available evidence from different
countries shows that the median entrepreneurs earn less than comparable employees,
but that a few entrepreneurs earn very high incomes (e.g., for the United States,
Hamilton, 2000; for West Germany, Merz, 2004; and for Finland, Poutvaara &
Tuomala, 2004). The modified model of entrepreneurship proposed here produces
this result. It is noteworthy that the result can only be obtained if non-monetary
considerations are taken into account. The inclusion of μ in the theoretical model
thus leads to a better understanding of a central characteristic of entrepreneurship,
namely its peculiar distribution of incomes.
The modified model provides a few additional interesting insights. Figure 3
shows that entrepreneurs are the richest individuals in the economy, but this doesn’t
necessarily mean that they are only interested in money. High-income entrepreneurs
may well get non-monetary satisfaction from their work, but this satisfaction is not
straightforward to detect in wage differentials, because the increasing returns to
ability characteristic of entrepreneurship makes this group difficult to compare to
regular employees. Wasserman (2004), however, provides empirical evidence that
founders of high-growth ventures are willing to work for less money compared to
other executives employed in their firms. This result is consistent with the view that
also high-potential entrepreneurs enjoy non-monetary benefits from work. A second
remarkable feature of the model is that it predicts people with low ability to become
ability A 
income
/ utility
entrepreneur 
income 
worker income /
utility 
A**
entrepreneur 
utility 
A* A’ 
Figure 3 Accounting for non-monetory benefits of entrepreneurship
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entrepreneurs (A<A′). It seems not unreasonable that persons with very poor income
prospects as employees start their own business in order to enjoy relative freedom. A
significant literature in entrepreneurship research, for example, argues that people at
the margin of society are likely to engage in entrepreneurship (see e.g., the survey in
Martinelli, 2001). As well, people with low education have been repeatedly found to
have an above-average likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs (e.g., Evans &
Leighton, 1989). The model predicts that these groups of entrepreneurs will run
very small firms, a result that seems plausible for at least parts of “minority” and
“low-education” entrepreneurship and that is certainly empirically testable.
Extensions and counterarguments
Extending the definition of entrepreneurship
In the preceding sections, entrepreneurship has been defined to mean that someone is
a self-employed business owner. This definition puts strong emphasis on the
ownership aspect of entrepreneurship, and as a consequence, stresses the role of
entrepreneurs as residual claimants, bearing the risk of doing business. While this
definition provides a relatively straightforward classification of who is an
entrepreneur, there is by far no consensus in the literature that entrepreneurship is
properly defined in this way (e.g., Parker, 2003). Important schools of thought
conceive entrepreneurship differently. Most importantly, following the tradition of
Schumpeter (1934), entrepreneurship is often seen as an innovative activity that
involves the carrying out of novel combinations and exploiting of new opportunities.
Such an “entrepreneurial” function can also be performed by employed managers in
established organizations, e.g., when they introduce new products, business
processes or organizational structures.
Does a changed definition, stressing the innovative nature of entrepreneurship,
require a restriction or modification of the arguments advanced? It shall be argued
that this is unlikely to be the case. A focus on entrepreneurship as innovative activity
involves similar issues as those discussed in the previous sections. In particular, it
can be shown that non-monetary benefits also play an important role in innovative
entrepreneurship.
A study by Åstebro (2003), already discussed in “Empirical evidence on the non-
profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship,” explicitly investigates invention activities
by small business owners. The evidence he presents suggests that efforts to innovate
are not undertaken so much because they pay in a monetary sense. The median
return on the sample of inventions he studies is negative, and their average return is
lower than for comparable risky investments, like high-risk securities or early-stage
venture capital funds. Although different interpretations of this result are possible
(see the next subsection), an explanation is that small-business innovators enjoy
substantial non-monetary satisfaction from pursuing their own creative ideas.
Related evidence has also been presented for the important subset of entrepreneurs
that found high-growth firms, i.e., start-ups that are often considered particularly
innovative and that are typically financed by venture-capital funds. Wasserman
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(2004) shows that founders of such firms in the United States are willing to work for
lower incomes than other, non-founding executives employed at the same firms
(even controlling for the level of stock and stock option ownership). This suggests
that founders of firms like Apple, Microsoft or Genentech may have started their
firms in the first place because they enjoyed substantial non-monetary satisfaction
from being an innovative entrepreneur. It is noteworthy that Schumpeter (1934: 93
f.) himself referred to the “joy of creating” as an explanation for why people engage
in entrepreneurial activities.6
Non-monetary satisfaction from being innovative has also been empirically
documented for contexts outside the narrow scope of business ownership. Stern
(2004), for example, shows that “scientists pay to be scientists.” According to his
empirical evidence, R&D organizations can offer lower wages to employed
researchers if they allow them to pursue and publish an individual research agenda
(in contrast to doing purely commercially oriented research). The empirical results
are particularly convincing because the author compares multiple job offers to the
same individuals. Similar non-monetary values of pursuing one’s own ideas have
been found for other innovative sectors and industries. In arts and entertainment, for
example, individuals have been consistently shown to accept an inferior earnings
situation in exchange for artistic and creative freedom. However, overall artists’
incomes correspond to a superstar-distribution similar to the one that can be
observed for entrepreneurs (e.g., Wassall & Alper, 1992; Throsby, 1996; Towse,
2000). At large, the behavior of people engaging in innovative ventures seems to be
in accordance with theories that stress the importance of intrinsic (non-monetary)
motivation for creativity and innovation (Amabile, 1983, 1997).
Counterarguments and alternative explanations
Does the empirical evidence discussed in the previous sections clearly show that
entrepreneurship is a non-profit-seeking activity? While the findings on wage and
return differentials for entrepreneurship seem to be an empirically robust
phenomenon, they might point to factors other than non-monetary benefits of being
an entrepreneur. Two alternative explanations in particular have received attention in
the literature: entrepreneurs might be people that are less risk-averse than others, and
they might be more over-optimistic.
A lower risk aversion of entrepreneurs can potentially explain the empirical
regularities observed, because entrepreneurs might not demand a risk premium if
they do not suffer from the higher income risk they face. As a result, the observed
6 The full passage in Schumpeter (1934: 93–94) reads as follows: First of all there is the dream and the
will to found a private kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty. [...] Then there is the will
to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the
fruits of success, but of success itself. From this aspect, economic action becomes akin to sport [...]. The
financial result is a secondary consideration, or, at all events, mainly valued as an index of success and as
a symptom of victory, the displaying of which very often is more important as a motive of large
expenditure than the wish for the consumers’ goods themselves. [...] Finally, there is the joy of creating, of
getting things done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity. [...] Our type seeks out
difficulties, changes in order to change, delights in ventures.”
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lower risk-adjusted returns associated with entrepreneurship might not reflect non-
monetary benefits from work, but could simply indicate differences in risk
preferences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. The empirical evidence
on differences in risk aversion, however, is rather inconclusive. van Praag and
Cramer (2001) and Cramer et al. (2002), for example, find that self-employed people
are more risk loving than employees using hypothetical survey questions about
gambling. On the other hand, Brockhaus (1980) and Tucker (1988) find insignificant
effects using similar survey measures, and Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) show that self-
employed persons are actually less likely to play in real-life lotteries than employees.
Overall, differences in risk aversion seem unlikely to explain why substantial income
and return differentials for entrepreneurship exist.
A more serious objection, and probably the most important counterargument
against the ideas proposed in this paper, is that entrepreneurs are not different in their
risk preferences, but that they assess risk in a biased way. Entrepreneurs may be
over-optimistic: they grossly overestimate their chances of success, and substantially
underestimate their subjective risk of failure. If such behavior prevails, entrepreneurs
might be prepared to accept an inferior material situation in exchange for the belief
that 1 day they will become one of the few, indeed existing, high-income entre-
preneurial superstars. This view corresponds well with the fact that entrepreneurial
incomes are characterized by a superstar-distribution. There are a few “big prices” to
win, and people try to obtain them despite the poor subjective chances to succeed.
Entrepreneurship, in this view, is similar to a “winner-take-all” market as described
in Frank and Cook (1995). Individuals engaging in entrepreneurship suffer from a
psychological bias, constantly justifying their inferior average material situation with
biased judgements about their chances for success.
There is indeed some evidence showing that entrepreneurs are more over-
optimistic than non-entrepreneurs. A study by Arabsheibani et al. (2000), in
particular, compares self-employed and employed persons’ expectations of future
prosperity with the actual outcomes they experience. The authors find that people are
in general over-optimistic with respect to their financial prospects, but the self-
employed are more so than employees. There were 4.6 times as many entrepreneurs
expect an improvement in their financial situation but experience a deterioration as
expect a deterioration in their financial situation but experience an improvement.
The ratio documented for employees is 2.9. The self-employed thus seem to be
worse at correctly forecasting their future financial prosperity, and they are system-
atically more over-optimistic about their prospects than employees. Entrepreneurial
optimism has also been documented in studies by Puri and Robinson (2005) and
Busenitz and Barney (1997).
Does the likely existence of over-optimism in entrepreneurs mean that, after all,
entrepreneurship is a “for-profit-seeking” activity? There are several arguments
suggesting that this is not the case. First, it is noteworthy that over-optimism
constitutes a psychological bias that is incompatible with profit-maximization; in this
sense, entrepreneurship is still a non-profit-seeking activity. In contrast to non-
monetary benefits of entrepreneurship, however, the existence of over-optimism
violates the concept of rational utility maximization (if it is a bias and not a
preference). An important counterargument against the prevalence of such biases is
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that business people who presumably are smart and rational would eventually
understand and overcome them. For example, it seems unlikely that the median self-
employed person who after 10 years in business earns 35% less than a comparable
employee (Hamilton, 2000) is still believing that he or she will become the next Bill
Gates. Rather, a more plausible explanation seems to be that these people remain in
business because they have come to appreciate the non-monetary benefits of being
an entrepreneur. Second, a substantial number of empirical findings discussed in
“Empirical evidence on the non-profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship,”
challenge the notion that over-optimism is particularly important. Benz and Frey
(2007), for example, show that the higher job satisfaction of the self-employed in
Western European, Northern American and Eastern European countries can mainly
be explained by the higher autonomy and the more interesting work content that they
enjoy, but not by their perceptions of better opportunities for advancing (which can
be seen as a proxy for income prospects). In the same vein, qualitative studies on
entrepreneurs’ motivations to start a firm have repeatedly shown that people do not
regard income considerations as an important reason for why they engaged in
entrepreneurship. Finally, as shown in “Implications for economic theories of
entrepreneurship,” the existence of a superstar-distribution of entrepreneurial
incomes can be theoretically explained by factors other than over-optimism, namely
by a combination of increasing returns to ability and non-monetary benefits of
entrepreneurship.
Implications for economic policy
What are the consequences for economic policy if entrepreneurship is a non-profit-
seeking activity? While the arguments advanced in this paper are mainly intended to
offer a re-conceptualization of the economic view on entrepreneurship, they are also
likely to have policy implications. In this section, it is shortly discussed how the
non-profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship changes traditional economic policy
views in the areas of tax policy, patent protection and competition policy.
Tax policy is generally seen as an important determinant of entrepreneurship (for
a survey see e.g., Schuetze & Bruce, 2004). For example, the relative tax burden on
entrepreneurship and wage employment can influence the decision of individuals to
become entrepreneurs, or the progressivity of the tax system can make entrepre-
neurship more or less attractive. Are the basic predictions on how taxes affect
entrepreneurship changed if the non-profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship is
taken into account? It has to be noted that this is unlikely to be the case.
Entrepreneurs motivated by non-monetary concerns will react to changes in financial
incentives at the margin in a similar way as entrepreneurs motivated by profit
concerns alone. The non-profit-seeking nature of entrepreneurship simply suggests
that the changes induced will start from a different level. Thus, if the encouragement
of entrepreneurship is a goal of public policy, tax measures are likely to achieve
these goals whether entrepreneurship is a non-profit-seeking activity or not.
Similar arguments can be made with respect to patent protection. Innovation
activities are likely to be stimulated by stronger patent rights irrespective of the
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underlying motivation to innovate. Again, the non-profit-seeking view of entrepre-
neurship is not concerned with changes at the margin, but with an explanation of the
levels of innovative activity, predicting a higher level of innovation for a given
strength of patent protection. In the extreme, a certain level of innovation efforts by
entrepreneurs is expected even if patent rights are very weak.
Policy implications are more concrete for the area of competition policy.
Competition policy traditionally focuses on the control of mergers and acquisitions
by established firms, with the aim of preventing excessive market power. While this
is without doubt important, the arguments presented in this paper suggest that
competition policy could alternatively concentrate on the foundation of new
enterprises. In a dynamic, Schumpeterian view of economic development, new
ventures are of crucial importance because they bring about most of the disruptive
“breakthrough” innovations (Baumol, 2004). If entrepreneurship is a non-profit-
seeking activity, one can expect an “oversupply” of entrepreneurship in these areas,
i.e., people will engage in entrepreneurial activities even if profit-making
opportunities are low. Competition policy can take advantage of this oversupply
by not restricting opportunities for entrepreneurship. In many countries, the barriers
to entry and the administrative burdens on running a business are still relatively high
(Djankow et al., 2002), and it has been empirically shown that such obstacles
depress entrepreneurial activity (Desai, Gompers, & Lerner, 2003; Klapper, Laeven,
& Rajan, 2004). Lowering barriers to entry and reducing administrative regulations
on conducting business can thus be seen as important elements of a dynamically
oriented competition policy. In essence, economic policies should preserve the
individual freedom to become and to be active as an entrepreneur. While this
recommendation is not particularly novel, it clearly contrasts with an approach that
stresses the need to provide monetary incentives to promote entrepreneurship. The
non-profit-seeking view of entrepreneurship suggests an alternative policy, namely
to simply enable entrepreneurial activities.
Finally, the question of what motivates people to become entrepreneurs is
important to assess the desirability of policy measures in general. If people suffer
from a psychological bias, like over-optimism, then public policies to increase
entrepreneurship are likely to have negative consequences. In this case, people are
encouraged to enter entrepreneurship even if they consequently suffer from inferior
financial outcomes and possibly also reduced overall satisfaction. In contrast, if
people “rationally” engage in entrepreneurship because they have a preference for its
non-monetary benefits, as suggested in this paper, then public policies such as
reducing barriers for entrepreneurship have more positive consequences. In this case,
the policy enables individuals to more freely choose the form of employment in which
they find the highest satisfaction (for evidence on this point, see e.g., Blanchflower,
Oswald, & Stutzer, 2001).
Conclusions
Entrepreneurship is a crucial function in market economies. It is therefore important
to understand what motivates people to engage in it. In this paper, it has been argued
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that traditional economic views on why individuals undertake entrepreneurial
activities are incomplete. Entrepreneurship is not only and not even mainly a quest
for profit. Rather, it is more accurately characterized as a non-profit-seeking activity.
Contrary to the belief that people engage in entrepreneurship in order to make
profits, a considerably body of empirical research shows that entrepreneurship is not
particularly attractive in monetary terms. Being an entrepreneur emerges to be
rewarding because it provides individuals with non-monetary satisfaction from
aspects like higher autonomy, greater possibilities to use their skills and abilities, and
the chance to be creative in pursuing their own ideas. It has been illustrated how
these non-monetary benefits can be incorporated into economic theories of
entrepreneurship. Further efforts along these lines seem instrumental in arriving at
an improved understanding of entrepreneurship.
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